## LEX Investors

# Take a Portfolio Snapshot with PERT 

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#### Abstract

The Stock Selection Guide is the "tool of great price" for all NAIC investors, the chief guide for building their portfolios. Once shares have been purchased, though, portfolio management becomes just as important to investment success as identifying prospective stock picks. Which holdings are doing well? Which ones should you keep? Which stocks do you sell?


Portfolio Evaluation Review Technique - PERT - is the NAIC tool for systematically tracking the financials of stocks in a portfolio. The LEX Investors of Lexington, Neb., recently sent Better Investing a mid-2003 PERT report (next page) that illustrates how useful the tool can be. Founded in September 1995, the all-w omen club invests chiefly to learn, with profits a secondary concern. Like many other club investors, the 15 members have a difficult time deciding when to sell.

Editor's note: Don't be overwhelmed by all the numbers. Take the time to understand one column at a time and you may be surprised at how helpful some of the information may be to you in your investing.

## Getting Started

To generate a PERT report with a computer, an investor must have for each stock in the portfolio a recent SSG file, typically created in either Toolkit, Classic Plus or Stock Analyst software. The decisions and judgments made with the SSGs carry forw ard into the PERT file.

In the accompanying example using Toolkit software, columns F through O (see bottom of PERT report) display quarterly results. Columns P through AB are a continuation of the SSGs in tabular form.

LEX Investors

| Company | No. <br> Shares* | Cost | Oct. Price | $\stackrel{2003}{2}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Gain/ } \\ & \text { (Loss) } \end{aligned}$ | \%Gain/ <br> (Loss) | Quality <br> Rating** | Growth <br> Estimate*** | \% of Portfolio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Citigroup Inc. | 31 | \$1,407 | \$47.08 | \$1,459 | \$52 | 4\% | 1 | 10\% | 4.1\% |
| Claire's Stores, Inc. | 51 | 910 | 37.91 | 1,933 | 1,023 | 112 | 1 | 14 | 5.4 |
| ConAgra Foods, Inc. | 119 | 3,107 | 23.36 | 2,780 | (327) | (11) | 1 | 5 | 7.8 |
| Exxon Mobil Corporation | 62 | 2,484 | 37.97 | 2,354 | (130) | (5) | 2 | 5 | 6.6 |
| Harley-Davidson, Inc. | 30 | 1,637 | 43.41 | 1,302 | (335) | (21) | 1 | 13 | 3.7 |
| Hewlet-Packard Company | 105 | 3,224 | 21.34 | 2,241 | (983) | (31) | 2 | 5 | 6.3 |
| The Home Depot, Inc. | 24 | 946 | 36.41 | 874 | (72) | (8) | 1 | 13 | 2.4 |
| Level 3 Communications, Inc. | 14 | 1,256 | 5.21 | 73 | $(1,183)$ | (94) | 5 | ? | 0.2 |
| Lowe's Companies, Inc. | 20 | 951 | 58.75 | 1,175 | 224 | 24 | 1 | 20 | 3.3 |
| Medtronic, Inc. | 40 | 2,013 | 46.61 | 1,864 | (149) | (7) | 2 | 14 | 5.2 |
| Microsoft Corporation | 60 | 2,154 | 27.16 | 1,630 | (524) | (24) | 2 | 7 | 4.6 |
| Office Depot, Inc. | 45 | 1,070 | 14.45 | 650 | (420) | (39) | 2 | 6 | 1.8 |
| Pfizer Inc. | 145 | 2,489 | 31.12 | 4,512 | 2,023 | 81 | 1 | 15 | 12.7 |
| Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 103 | 1,682 | 57.98 | 5,972 | 4,290 | 255 | 1 | 12 | 16.8 |
| Walgreen Co . | 50 | 1,553 | 34.01 | 1,701 | 148 | 10 | 1 | 14 | 4.8 |
| Wells Fargo \& Company | 68 | 2,837 | 54.70 | 3,720 | 883 | 31 | 1 | 13 | 10.4 |
| Cash |  | 1,406 |  | 1,406 |  |  |  |  | 3.9 |
| TOTAL |  | \$31,126 |  | \$35,646 | \$4,520 | 15\% |  |  | 100.0\% |

[^0]| MATIOML Associanom |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Portfolio Evaluation Review Technique <br> Date $\qquad$ 07/25/2003 |  |  |  |  | Page: 1 of 2 <br> Portfolio: LAVERE BRINKMANLEX INVEST Prepared using The NAIC Investor's Toolkit |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DV | COMPANY | \% | EST |  | EPS | SALES | PRE-TAX PROFIT | $\begin{array}{c\|} \hline \text { TRAILING } \\ 12 \text { MOS EPS } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CUR } \\ & \text { PIE } \end{aligned}$ | PRICE | RV | 5 YR AVE pIE RATIO | EST <br> GROWTH <br> RATE <br> EPS | PIE AS \% OF GROWTHRATE | $\begin{aligned} & \text { US/ } \\ & \text { DS } \end{aligned}$ | \% COMPDANNUALRATE OFRETURN | EST FIVE YEARS |  |
| OV | COMPANY | YLD | EPS | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { QTR } \\ & \text { END } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \% \\ & \hline \end{aligned} \begin{array}{r} \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|cc\|} \hline \text { MILL } & \% \\ \$ & \mathrm{CHG} \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ccc\|} \hline \text { MILL } & \% & \% \\ \$ & \text { SALES } & \text { CHG } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{cc} \$ & \% \\ & \mathrm{CHG} \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |  |  | HI AVG LOW |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { LON } \\ & \text { PRICE } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|c\|} \hline \text { HIGH } \\ \text { PRICE } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| 0.70 | Citigroup | 1.5 | 3.35 | $\begin{aligned} & 03 / 03 \\ & 03 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.76 \\ 0.74 \\ 2.7 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 18,150.0 \\ 17,798.0 \\ 2.0 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 601.066 \cdot 3.311 .7 \% \\ & 5.772 .6 \quad 32.4 \% \\ & 10312.5 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3.02 \\ & \text { NMF } \end{aligned}$ | 13.5 | $\begin{array}{r} 45.22 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 85.4 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline 20.2 & \\ \quad 15.8 \\ \quad 11.3 \end{array}$ | 11.0 | 122.6 | 3.1 | 19.3 | 27.1 | 102.2 |
| 0.16 | Claires | 0.5 | 1.28 | $\begin{aligned} & 07 / 02 \\ & 07 / 01 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.31 \\ 0.03 \\ 933.3 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 238.7 \\ & 221.3 \\ & 7.9 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 23.315 .89 .767 .8 \% \\ & 2.3 \quad 1.0 \% \\ & 1033402.0 \% \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.16 \\ & \text { NMF } \end{aligned}$ | 24.4 | $\begin{array}{r} 31.13 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 162.6 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline 19.2 & \\ & 15.0 \\ & 10.8 \end{array}$ | 10.0 | 244.0 | 0.9 | 10.1 | 115 | 49.2 |
| 0.06 | $\text { Clayton } \mathrm{HO}_{\mathrm{O}}$ mes | 0.5 | 1.00 | $\begin{aligned} & 12 / 01 \\ & 12 / 00 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.22 \\ 0.19 \\ 15.8 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 306.9 \\ & 296.4 \\ & 3.5 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 48.297. } 15.737 .1 \% \\ & 41.6 \quad 14.1 \% \\ & 115870.0 \% \end{aligned}$ | $0.92$ <br> NMF | 12.7 | $\begin{array}{r} 12.73 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 90.0 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline 18.3 \\ \quad 14.2 \\ \quad 10.0 \end{array}$ | 9.0 | 141.0 | 2.7 | 15. | 8.1 | 25.1 |
| 0.95 | Con Aga | 3.8 | 1.57 | $\begin{aligned} & 11 / 01 \\ & 11 / 00 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.36 \\ 0.23 \\ 56.5 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 6,415.0 \\ 6,437.0 \\ -0.3 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{lr} \hline 27.730 .9 & 432.3 \% \\ 195.1 & 30 \% \\ 14112.2 \% & \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $1.47$ <br> NMF | 16.2 | $\begin{array}{r} 25.33 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 96.3 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 20.4 \\ & \quad 16.8 \\ & \quad 13.2 \end{aligned}$ | 6.5 | 248.9 | 2.0 | 13.9 | 174 | 41.0 |
| 0.92 | Exxon Mobi I | 2.5 | 2.03 | $\begin{aligned} & 06 / 02 \\ & 06 / 01 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.60 \\ 0.30 \\ 100.0 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 52,500.0 \\ 38,740.0 \\ 35.5 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{lr} \hline 67.289 .0 & 128.2 \% \\ 3.263 .1 & 8.4 \% \\ 1962.1 \% & \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $1.91$ <br> NMF | 18.3 | $\begin{array}{r} 37.20 \\ 06 / 17 / 103 \end{array}$ | 78.5 | $\begin{aligned} & 25.1 \\ & \quad 21.8 \\ & \quad 18.5 \end{aligned}$ | 6.5 | 281.3 | 8.0 | 10.8 | 349 | 55.5 |
| 0.14 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { HARLEY-DAV } \\ & \text { IDSON } \end{aligned}$ | 0.3 | 2.19 | $\begin{aligned} & 12 / 02 \\ & 12 / 01 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.50 \\ 0.39 \\ 28.2 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 1,035.6 \\ 894.4 \\ 15.8 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 231.03822 .309 .7 \% \\ & 181.7 \quad 20.3 \% \\ & 127068.1 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.90 \\ & \text { NMF } \end{aligned}$ | 19.1 | $\begin{array}{r} 42.00 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 64.0 | $\begin{aligned} & 37.1 \\ & 29.9 \\ & 22.7 \end{aligned}$ | 15.5 | 123.5 | 99.9+ | 28.5 | 431 | 145.1 |
| 0.00 | Hewlett Pa ckard | 0.0 | . 95 | $\begin{aligned} & 01 / 03 \\ & 01 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.29 \\ 0.23 \\ 26.1 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 17,877.0 \\ 19,597.0 \\ -8.8 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 11.647 .3 $65.2 \%$ <br> 917.6 $4.7 \%$ <br> $1169.3 \%$  <br> 1.3409 $92 \%$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.86 \\ 0.71 \\ 21.1 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 22.9 | $\begin{array}{r} 21.89 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 85.6 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 37.2 \\ & 26.8 \\ & \quad 16.4 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 11.0 | 208.5 | 2.9 | 17.7 | 125 | 49.5 |
| 0.21 | Home Depot | 0.6 | 1.86 | $\begin{aligned} & 04 / 02 \\ & 04 / 01 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.36 \\ 0.36 \\ 0.0 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 14,625.0 \\ 14,182.0 \\ 3.1 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 1.340 .9 $92 \%$ <br> 1.347 .7 $9.5 \%$ <br> $-0.5 \%$  | $\begin{array}{r} 1.56 \\ 1.38 \\ 13.0 \% \end{array}$ | 18.0 | $\begin{array}{r} 33.43 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 45.4 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 53.4 \\ & 39.7 \\ & 26.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 19.0 | 94.8 | 11.0 | 43.4 | 184 | 198.6 |
| 0.08 | Lowe's | 0.2 | 2.37 | $\begin{aligned} & 04 / 03 \\ & 04 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.52 \\ 0.44 \\ 18.2 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,445.0 \\ 6,471.0 \\ 15.1 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 654.897 .8 .796 .5 \% \\ & 549.6 \quad 8.5 \% \\ & 119063.9 \% \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.93 \\ 1.46 \\ 32.2 \% \end{array}$ | 19.1 | $\begin{array}{r} 45.29 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 72.8 | $\begin{aligned} & 34.3 \\ & \quad 26.2 \\ & \quad 18.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 23.0 | 82.9 | 4.7 | - 31.8 | 171 | 178.7 |
| 0.24 | MEDTRONIC, INC | 0.5 | 1.70 | $\begin{aligned} & 07 / 03 \\ & 07 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.38 \\ 0.32 \\ 18.8 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2,040.0 \\ 1,714.0 \\ 19.0 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 66.239 .43 .247 .0 \% \\ 557.7 & 32.5 \% \\ 11777.0 \% & \end{array}$ | $1.47$ <br> NMF | 29.6 | $\begin{array}{r} 50.31 \\ 07 / 16 / 03 \end{array}$ | 75.6 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 48.8 \\ & 39.2 \\ & \quad 29.6 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 15.5 | 191.2 | 10.1 | 23.3 | 41.4 | 140.5 |
| 0.00 | Microsoft | 0.0 | 1.03 | $\begin{aligned} & 12 / 02 \\ & 12 / 01 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.26 \\ 0.23 \\ 13.0 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,741.0 \\ 6,585.0 \\ 17.6 \% \end{array}$ | 40.917 .1 $528.6 \%$ <br> 3.654 .4 $55.5 \%$ <br> $1019.7 \%$  <br> 15.4  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.94 \\ & \text { NMF } \end{aligned}$ | 25.2 | $\begin{array}{r} 26.08 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 54.0 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 62.9 \\ & 46.7 \\ & 30.5 \end{aligned}$ | 10.0 | 252.2 | 99.9+ | 29.5 | 403 | 95.0 |
| 0.00 | Office Dep ot | 0.0 | 1.10 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 03 / 03 \\ & 03 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.32 \\ 0.32 \\ 0.0 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 3,200.0 \\ 3,022.0 \\ 5.9 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $154.257 .44 .820 .5 \%$  <br> 151.9 $5.0 \%$ <br> $101460.9 \%$  | $\begin{array}{r} 0.98 \\ 0.91 \\ 7.7 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 13.6 | $\begin{array}{r} 15.02 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 75.7 | $\begin{gathered} 25.6 \\ 18.0 \\ 10.4 \end{gathered}$ | 12.5 | 109.0 | 3.3 | 24.7 | 59 | 45.3 |
| 0.52 | PFIZER INC | 1.4 | 1.84 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 03 / 03 \\ & 03 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.44 \\ 0.38 \\ 15.8 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 8,600.0 \\ 7,747.0 \\ 11.0 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 354.205.i4.118.7\% <br> $3.0 \quad 0 \%$ <br> $11946580.0 \%$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.59 \\ 1.36 \\ 16.9 \% \end{array}$ | 19.7 | $\begin{array}{r} 36.24 \\ 06 / 17 / 03 \end{array}$ | 55.4 | 44.1 $35.6$ <br> 27.1 | 15.5 | 127.3 | 9.6 | 32.2 | 25.6 | 138.5 |
| 0.15 | WALGREENC $0$ | 0.5 | 1.15 | $\begin{aligned} & 08 / 02 \\ & 08101 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.24 \\ 0.21 \\ 14.3 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 7,235.0 \\ 6,284.0 \\ 15.1 \% \end{array}$ | 395.5 $5.5 \%$ <br> 343.6 $5.5 \%$ <br> $15.1 \%$  <br> 2.36  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.99 \\ & \text { NMF } \end{aligned}$ | 26.1 | $\begin{array}{r} 30.00 \\ 06 / 18 / 03 \end{array}$ | 61.0 | $\begin{aligned} & 54.1 \\ & 42.8 \\ & 31.5 \end{aligned}$ | 16.0 | 163.3 | 99.9+ | 30.5 | 30.9 | 111.4 |
| 1.10 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WELLS FARG } \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | 2.1 | 3.91 | $\begin{aligned} & 03 / 03 \\ & 03 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.88 \\ 0.80 \\ 10.0 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 196,000.0 \\ 174,605.0 \\ 12.3 \% \end{array}$ | 2.363 .4 $1.2 \%$ <br> 2.109 .8 $1.2 \%$ <br> $12.0 \%$  | $\begin{array}{r} 3.40 \\ 2.16 \\ 57.4 \% \end{array}$ | 13.2 | $\begin{array}{r} 51.69 \\ 06 / 17 / 103 \end{array}$ | 69.2 | $\begin{aligned} & 23.2 \\ & \quad 19.1 \\ & \quad 14.9 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 15.0 | 88.1 | 47.2 | 26.7 | 49.5 | 155.0 |
| 0.30 | WalMart | 0.5 | 2.23 | $\begin{aligned} & 04 / 03 \\ & 04 / 02 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.42 \\ 0.37 \\ 13.5 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 61,000.0 54,960.0 11.0\% | 288.421 .9 $472.8 \%$ <br> 2.3 $0.0 \%$ <br> $12433220.0 \%$  | $\begin{array}{r} 1.96 \\ 1.56 \\ 25.6 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 24.7 | $\begin{array}{r} 55.12 \\ 06 / 17 / 103 \end{array}$ | 70.7 | $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 43.7 \\ 34.9 \\ \quad 26.1 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 14.0 | 176.2 | 2.9 | 23.1 | 21.2 | 152.5 |
| B | c | D | E | F | G H | 1 J | K L M | $\mathrm{N} \quad 0$ | P | Q | R | S T U | V | W X | $Y$ | Z | AA | AB |
| Stock Snapshot. This PERT report for LEX Investors displays the financial status of holdings within the club's portfolio. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

(Editor's note: Data for Level 3 Communications, Inc., wasn't provided in the club's PERT report. Clayton Homes, Inc., which the club also listed as part of its portfolio, has sinœe been acquired by Berkshire Hathaway Inc.)

Column E is estimated earnings per share about 12 months in the future. The default values are mathematical extensions of EPS based on the estimated growth rates in EPS (Column V). It's important that estimated EPS in column E be based on published analyst estimates. Good sources are Barron's w eekly magazine and First Call as published at my.yahoo.com.

## Analyst Estimates Adjusted

Simple math will adjust analysts' fiscal-year estimates to the periods ending 12 months later. Assume it's February 2004 and a company's fiscal year ends in May, three months later. It's another nine months from May 2004 to February 2005.

Assume the EPS estimate for the fiscal year ending May 2004 is $\$ 1$ and the estimate for the fiscal year ending May 2005 is $\$ 1.17$. The calculation goes as follows:

| $3 / 12 \times \$ 1.00$ | $=\$ 0.25$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| $9 / 12 \times \$ 1.17$ | $=\$ 0.88$ |
| 12-month estimate | $=\$ 1.13$ |

In Toolkit the procedure is to left click, open Portfolio PERT and click OK, which opens the PERT report for the portfolio. Next, select Options and enter Estimated EPS. You are then presented with Override Calculated Estimates for EPS. You can then enter each stock's estimated EPS adjusted for 12 months in the future.

When entering quarterly data, round off the numbers to millions of dollars so that you don't end up with long numbers as shown in pre-tax profit (columns K, L and M) for the LEX Investors portfolio. Also, if NAIC Online Premium Services (OPS) files are used, you can be


LEX Investors. From left: Jeanette Richardson, Ginger Bode, Marian Kline, Shirley Reynolds, Bev Fellers, Jane Hibberd, Muriel Shea, Mary Hodges, Marge Kopf, Carole Philpot, J eanne Kelly and Lynette Phillips. Not pictured: LaVere Brinkman, Sally Leu and Pat Post.
reasonably confident they were updated within seven to 14 days of the company's latest earnings release.

## Performance Measured

By reviewing quarterly percentage changes in EPS, sales and pre-tax profit (columns H, J and M), you can ascertain short-term performance. Pre-tax profit margin - pretax profits as a percentage of sales or revenues - is displayed under pre-tax profit (Column L - difficult to see in the illustration, which has been reduced significantly in size). Any significant decline in pre-tax profit margins calls for further investigation.

If it reflects a trend, a significant decrease in profit margin warns of declining price-earnings ratio and price. Compare the percentage change in quarterly EPS, sales and pre-tax profits with the estimated growth rate in EPS (Column V).

Depending on how the economy is faring at that point in the business cycle, any significant deterioration may call for some digging. The quarterly changes for The Home Depot, Inc., compared with Lowe's Companies, Inc., for example, may be reason for concern. Likewise, the percentage changes for Office

Depot, Inc., suggest changes may be in order.

Unfortunately, LEX Investors did not enter data for pre-tax profit in a consistent manner. The calculated profit margins and percentage changes therefore aren't alw ays correct in the example.

## SSG Continued

The right side of the PERT report (oolumns P to AB ) is an extension of the SSGs. Estimated EPS in Column E represents projections 12 months in the future, while the calculations for columns $Y$ through AB are for an additional four or five years in total.

The five-year average P/E ratios (columns S, T and U) are from the SSG files in the club's computer. The usefulness of the resulting calculations will only be as valuable as the judgments made in the SSG analysis. By striking out annual P/E ratios that don't seem to be plausible for the future, the resulting calculations of relative value (Column R), compound annual rate of return (Column Z), estimated five-year low price (Column AA) and estimated fiveyear high price (Column AB) will be more realistic.

For example, I see average $P / E$ ratios of 39.7 for The Home Depot, Inc., 39.2 for Medtronic, Inc., 46.7 for Microsoft Corporation and 35.6 for Pfizer Inc. (see box). If we calculate the PEG ratios - in PERT, the P/E as a percentage of growth rate - we can easily see how unrealistic these valuations appear to be.

|  | Estimated EPS <br> Growth Rate | Average |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | P/E | PEG |  |
| Home Depot | $13 \%$ | 39.7 | $305 \%$ |
| Medtronic | 14 | 39.2 | 280 |
| Microsoft | 7 | 46.7 | 667 |
| Pfizer | 15 | 35.6 | 237 |

## Valuations Pinned Down

The estimated growth rates are my estimates, as opposed to the even higher figures shown on the spreadsheet for the club's portfolio. It follows as the night follows day that if the estimates for the EPS growth rates are in the ballpark, then the expected high P/E ratios are outrageous. (PEG figures of 100 percent to 150 percent are viewed by many NAIC investors as attractive valuations in the current market.)

This all gets back to the decisions made on the SSGs. Unless realistic judgment is employed, the results
for the SSGs and the PERT reports will be deceiving. The solution is to calculate each PEG ratio - the P/E ratio as a percentage of the estimated EPS growth rate - and see whether they're realistic.

When a PEG ratio exceeds 150 percent (also expressed as 1.5), it looks to me as if the investor is discounting not only the future, but also the hereafter. Using average P/E ratios that are unrealistic relative to estimated EPS grow th rates will produce figures for relative value (Column R) suggesting stocks are reasonably priced when the reverse is true. Use future $P / E$ ratios that are reasonable.

## Problems Tagged

Some specific red flags are evident on the club's PERT report. The upsidedownside ratios of Harley-Davidson, Inc., and Microsoft Corporation are 99.9 to 1. That's because the current prices (Column Q) are less than the estimated low prices (Column AA). Perhaps the estimated future low prices entered on the SSGs were far too optimistic.

Level 3 Communications, Inc., has no history of earnings. It's a speculative investment. The club may also want to re-examine Hewlett-Packard Company results are disappointing.

## Patterns Watched

Generally speaking, when the current price of a stock falls below a conservatively estimated low price on an SSG, this pattern signals problems and a possible sell decision. Consider Cisco Systems, Inc., Lucent Technologies Inc. and Time Warner Inc. (formerly AOL Time Warner Inc.). If investors had sold these and other highfliers when the current prices fell below conservatively estimated low prices in SSGs, big losses might have been avoided.

The club shows estimated future EPS growth rates of 6.5 percent for Exxon Mobil Corporation and for ConAgra Foods, Inc. I would not disagree with these estimates.

Such modest growth rates aren't, however, likely to produce profitable investments unless the stocks can be purchased at P/E ratios that appear to allow for considerable expansion. Again, what's a reasonable P/E ratio for such a modest grow th rate?

The SSG and PERT can be valuable tools for investment success. They must, how ever, be used with logic and reasonable expectations.

Ralph L. Seger, Jr., CFA, serves as chairman of Seger-Elvekrog Inc. (www.segerelvekrog.com), a Bloomfield Hills, Mich., investment management firm. He is an NAIC trustee and a member of Better Investing's Editorial Advisory and Securities Review Committee. The opinions expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not reflect positions of either Better Investing or NAIC.


[^0]:    * Rounded to the nearest full share.
    ** Based on rankings published monthly in Standard \& Poor's Stock Guide or as estimated by the author.
    *** EPS growth over the next 3 to 5 years as estimated by the author, with data from Value Line. (A question mark signifies uncertain growth prospects.)

