Morningstar Rating Last Price \*\* 30.95 USD 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019 19:09, UTC

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Vield % 1.35 1.49

30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Vield % Market Can (Ril) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry **Auto Parts**  Stewardshin Standard

#### 22:43. UTC **Morningstar Pillars** Analyst Quantitative Economic Moat Narrow Narrow Overvalued High Medium

Valuation Uncertainty Financial Health Strong

Source: Morningstar E				
Quantitative Valuation				
		GNTX		
(USA)	9			
Undervalued	Fairly Valued	Overvalued		

	Current	5-Yr Avg	Sector	Country
Price/Quant Fair Value	1.21	1.01	0.80	0.83
Price/Earnings	18.6	15.5	16.2	20.1
Forward P/E	17.7	_	12.3	13.9
Price/Cash Flow	14.8	12.7	10.2	13.1
Price/Free Cash Flow	17.2	16.4	17.7	19.5
Trailing Dividend Yields	6 1.49	1.87	2.46	2.35
Source: Morningstar				

#### **Bulls Sav**

- Auto-dimming technology has applications to other parts of the car like headlights, as well as outside autos such as airplane windows. Although small now, markets outside the auto industry could prove to be very large businesses down the road.
- The company's financial health is so strong that we think Gentex can survive any downturn in the U. S. easier than other auto suppliers can.
- ► Biometrics and electronic toll payments could open up new revenue streams for the company.

#### **Bears Say**

- Cameras could replace Gentex's mirrors, if regulators throughout the world allowed it. We don't think this is a likely threat, at least not anytime in the near future in very large volume.
- Gentex hoards cash but has made good effort recently to buy back stock while increasing its dividend. A higher dividend would give shareholders-instead of management--more control in allocating excess capital.
- As auto-dimming mirrors become available on more vehicle models, OEMs may want to lower their own costs by pressuring Gentex to reduce prices, or by supporting emerging competitors.

**Important Disclosure:** 

The conduct of Morningstar's analysts is governed by Code of Ethics/Code of Conduct Policy, Personal Security Trading Policy (or an equivalent of), and Investment Research Policy. For information regarding conflicts of interest, please visit http://global.morningstar.com/equitydisclosures

## Gentex Keeps Rolling Along to End 2019 Despite Global Uncertainties

## **Business Strategy and Outlook**

David Whiston, CFA, CPA, CFE, Analyst, 31 October 2019

Gentex creates auto-dimming rear- and side-view mirrors that use electrochromic technology. These mirrors automatically darken to eliminate headlight glare for drivers and have many other applications. With over 1,400 patents worldwide, some valid through 2043, and a dominant 92% market share, up from 77% in 2003, Gentex has a narrow economic moat it should be able to protect for a long time.

The growth prospects for auto-dimming mirrors look strong. Gentex estimates that in 2017, about 30% of all cars had interior auto-dimming mirrors, and about 12% had at least one exterior auto-dimming mirror. Demand remains healthy with annual revenue growth often exceeding industry vehicle production growth. Growth will come from increased vehicle penetration as more original-equipment manufacturers make the safety benefit of auto-dimming technology available and as Gentex's research leads to new, advanced-feature mirrors that ultimately become standard products.

SmartBeam, which automatically turns a vehicle's brights on or off and can also allow brights to be on continuously, is sold mostly in Europe, but its safety benefits could expand if U.S. regulators change current rules as proposed in October 2018. Research has found that drivers use their brights optimally only about 25% of the time. Active safety is a very fast-growing field, so more camera products are likely to show up on other vehicle programs and Gentex develops its own cameras. A recent example is the full display mirror, which the driver can toggle between a normal auto-dimming mirror and a display image while driving at high speed. Other growth areas include biometrics in mirrors, which we see having application in autonomous ride hailing, dimmable sunroofs, and universal toll payments.

Over the long term, Gentex's technology also could be brought to more airplane windows. The company (in conjunction with PPG Aerospace) supplies auto-dimming passenger windows for the Boeing 787 and 777X and could eventually expand to more aircraft makers. The

September 2013 purchase of HomeLink from Johnson Controls is another expansion outside the mirror. It also is targeting RFID parking barriers in Asia with HomeLink.

#### **Analyst Note**

David Whiston, CFA, CPA, CFE, Analyst, 31 January 2020

Gentex finished 2019 with a solid fourth guarter that shows its growth story is not near an end. Diluted EPS did decline year over year by 5% to \$0.39 while revenue fell 2%; however, both figures beat the Refinitiv consensus (\$0.02 EPS beat). We are not changing our fair value estimate but as always we will reassesses all modeling assumptions after Gentex files its 10-K. Management's 2020 guidance calls for as much as a nearly 8% rise in revenue over 2019's \$1.859 billion as the rollout of the high-priced full display mirror continues and auto dimming mirror penetration continues its gradual penetration increase. FDM full-year unit volume grew 89% over 2018 to 739,000 units while total company mirror volume rose 3% to 42.9 million. This 3% growth rate is impressive given management called out an approximate 6% decline in global light vehicle production. 2020 revenue guidance is also well above the industry's light vehicle production based on Gentex citing IHS' negative 1% forecast decline versus 2019 for the combined areas of North America, Europe, Japan, Korea, and China.

As long as the U.S. and Europe do not fall into recession we don't see major problems looming for Gentex this year, though the coronavirus in China may cause further production shutdowns beyond what the industry is already planning for in the first nine days of February. The start of a year also means Gentex starts its annual pricing battle when early in the year it incurs annual pricing reductions from its customers, as is customary in the auto industry. The company then, usually after first quarter, obtains pricing reductions from its suppliers as well as improves its cost structure via finding manufacturing efficiencies. Gentex is very good at this, which is one reason it can keep its gross margins in the upper 30% range.

#### **Economic Moat**

David Whiston, Analyst, 31 October 2019

Gentex's cost advantage from economies of scale, its



Morningstar Rating Last Price 30.95 USD Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Vield % 1.49 1.35

30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Yield % Market Can (Bil) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

Industry 7.83 Auto Parts 30 Jan 2020

Stewardshin Standard

\*\* 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

22:43. UTC

19:09 LITC

customers' switching costs, and intangible assets give the firm a narrow moat. Patents, innovations such as SmartBeam, and a consistent world-class manufacturing process have let the firm increase its auto-dimming mirror share to 92%. We see this as representative of a moat because Gentex does not give any reason for a customer to try another auto-dimming mirror supplier nor leave room for many competitors. The firm's technological leadership increases our confidence that Gentex will hold, if not keep increasing, market share. Given that the company is patient with its engineers in order to encourage innovation, we do not think Gentex will lose its competitive edge. Its research and development spending as a percentage of revenue is one of the highest in our supplier coverage. Gentex was the first to market with electrochromic automatic-dimming mirrors, so the company enjoyed pricing benefits from the early adopters of the technology. Its unique product and its ability to commercialize the technology and continually make patent-protected innovative changes to the automatic-dimming mirror has enabled Gentex to generate returns on invested capital vastly superior to other auto suppliers. The company's market share gain to 92% of auto-dimming mirrors from the low 80s in recent years shows the superior quality of its product and the reliability of Gentex to deliver on time, suggesting that customers would face switching costs to move over to Magna Mirrors.

Auto suppliers are not chosen purely on price. A firm has to be reliable and get it right every time while also serving an automaker globally. There are not many suppliers that can do that, let alone mirror suppliers that can. Once a supplier has the business, it is extremely rare to lose it, especially during a vehicle program, because automakers then have to remove tooling from the supplier, which can cost millions. An automaker would also have to incur expensive validation testing of a new supplier, all while the production line is not making any vehicles and decimating an automaker's ability to recoup its fixed costs. Gentex also has traditionally kept a debt free balance sheet, partly so its cash hoard ensures it can keep its supply chain moving (such as in the Great Recession or after the Japan tsunami) and thus will never be the reason an automaker has to stop its production line.

This consistent reliability is not something that just anyone who can get a loan to start a mirror company could do easily or quickly. Automakers' move to more global platforms is very good news for Gentex since a supplier must be able to service the OEM consistently all over the world. A regional player cannot do this, and we think a small firm would be hesitant to borrow lots of money to add new facilities and overhead all over the world without any guarantee of winning new business. Automakers want the same supplier on a program all over the world due to scale benefits for them and reliability with a vendor that knows the vehicle program.

Gentex grows its share and keeps competitors at bay by bringing many, often patented, offerings (SmartBeam, HomeLink, FDM, telematics, and so on) into the electrochromic mirror, which, along with Gentex's consistent quality (both in the mirror and in the ease of integration of the mirror into the vehicle's other systems), makes it hard to beat in a proposal. These add-on features make the automaker money too because they are typically bundled with other non-Gentex features in an expensive tech or safety package on a vehicle. This allows the automaker to offer a variety of trims without having to redesign a vehicle's interior at great expense. Gentex has also told us the customer (the automaker) makes more money on Gentex products than Gentex does, which helps the switching cost moat source because a customer has little reason to switch on something it is buying for say \$45 and selling as one part of a multi-thousand dollar option package. Also, with growth potential in vision systems (FDM, camera monitoring systems), connected car via HomeLink and the integrated tolling module service, and large area dimmable surfaces (sunroofs, airplane windows), we don't think AVs automatically mean doom for Gentex.

However, the company is probably not a wide-moat candidate, in our opinion, Even Gentex faces customer demands for annual price reductions of about 2%-3%. Gentex's gross margins declined to 32.6% in the recession years of 2008 and 2009, from 43.2% in 1999. Suppliers are at the mercy of the automakers' production schedules and relentless annual demands for price concessions. Each automaker's volume makes the supplier very dependent on this large source of revenue. Furthermore, the auto industry is so cyclical that in bad times even the best parts suppliers cannot avoid large declines in return on invested capital and profit. In Gentex's case, ROIC was more than 40% in the late 1990s but fell to about 15% in 2009, before rebounding to about 25% in subsequent years. Cost-cutting helps ease the pain, but it does not restore all lost profit. We model ROIC in the mid-20s for



Morningstar Rating Last Price \*\*

30.95 USD 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020 22:43. UTC

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019 19:09 LITC

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Yield % 1.49 1.35

Forward Dividend Yield % Market Can (Bil) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry **Auto Parts**  Stewardshin Standard

most of our five-year forecast period.

30 Jan 2020

#### **Fair Value & Profit Drivers**

David Whiston, Analyst, 31 October 2019

We are maintaining our fair value estimate at \$23. We model revenue to increase about 3.5% on a five-year compound annual basis with high single digit top line growth in the outer years of our forecast due to growth after an assumed slowdown. We model operating margin to average about 25% during our five-year explicit forecast period. We project revenue based on a global vehicle production forecast, global auto-dimming mirror penetration, Gentex's market share, and average selling price. We assume a continued increase in penetration throughout our forecast period due to attractive growth prospects and Gentex's history. We believe additional margin expansion will remain difficult, since automakers always seek price concessions.

The full display mirror is an innovation we like. We have driven several vehicles with this mirror and think that the full display mirror is far safer than a conventional auto-dimming mirror. Although major revenue from this mirror is not expected for a few more years, we think it has potential to be in every vehicle in the developed world due to its superior function over a normal mirror. We think the firm's manufacturing efficiency, product expertise, and high-tech products will keep gross margins in the upper 30% range but continued research and development, annual price reductions, and overhead spending will prevent major operating margin expansion. We project capital expenditures in the upper 5% of revenue range for most of our forecast period and R&D expenses of over 7% of revenue on average. Our long term tax rate is 19%.

We model Gentex's auto-dimming mirror market share going to 95% over our five-year explicit forecast period because we see no major threat from other firms. Gentex's quality and reliability are very hard to beat, and customers do not source mirrors solely based on price, which reduces the threat from low-cost Asian suppliers. We keep our Stage II profit assumptions lower than we normally would to handicap the risk of cameras replacing mirrors long-term.

#### **Risk & Uncertainty**

David Whiston, Analyst, 31 October 2019

Gentex's only large competitor is Magna Mirrors. Magna

has much deeper pockets than Gentex and could invest substantially in its auto-dimming mirror group to try to beat Gentex's technology advantage or devote more sales resources than Gentex can afford. Also, there is always the possibility that a new and superior technology will be invented and take over the auto-dimming mirror market, but we consider this risk remote. The HomeLink acquisition could prove to not be as lucrative as management expected. Some products such as high-beam assist are increasingly going into bundled packages in higher-trim vehicles, which means more competition for Gentex's SmartBeam product. Finally, it is possible that Gentex could be put out of the automotive supply chain if governments start allowing camera technology to replace all types of mirrors in a vehicle, as Europe and Japan now do under UN-ECE Regulation 46. Although we think cameras replacing mirrors in large volume is more than a decade a way if it even happens at all, our fair value estimate may be severely reduced if such legislation causes consumers to prefer cameras over mirrors in large volume or fully autonomous cars lead to no mirrors in a vehicle. The company's expertise in camera systems, however, may make this legislative risk far less problematic than Gentex's critics fear. Furthermore, currently display-only systems require retooling of the vehicle and cost more than a mirror. Uncertainty as to image quality in poor weather or from other obstructions needs to be considered by regulators as well. A dual camera/mirror system provides a redundancy for safety in case a camera's lens is blocked by weather or debris on the lens. In light of this regulatory risk, the fact that Gentex's stock price is not immune to the cycle whims of the auto industry, and more active safety content possibly being placed in the center stack, dashboard, or window, rather than the mirror, our fair value uncertainty rating is set at high.

#### Stewardship

David Whiston, Analyst, 31 October 2019

Former chairman and CEO Fred Bauer founded Gentex in 1974 and owned 2.3% of the company until his retirement in January 2018. Bauer retired from the board as well but remains an employee for advisory services for five years after retiring. He will be paid \$447,000 in 2019 and 2020, and \$298,000 in 2021 and 2022. Bauer also received a \$2.1 million retirement payout, and Gentex bought a building it uses owned by Bauer for \$950,000. Gentex also repurchased about 5.5 million Gentex shares owned by Bauer for \$20.98 a share, about 2.3% of the company and



Morningstar Rating Last Price

22:43. UTC

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Vield % 1.35 1.49

30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Vield % Market Can (Ril) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry Auto Parts Stewardshin Standard

\*\* 30.95 USD 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

19:09. UTC

effectively all of Bauer's stock. This retirement package is more generous than we'd like to see but not surprising, given that Bauer is the founder.

Lead independent director James Wallace is now chairman, while President Steve Downing, 41, added the CEO role in January 2018. Downing joined Gentex in 2002, and we think he is an outstanding executive and the right choice for CEO because of his strong knowledge of Gentex's finances as well as its products and operations. Downing was CFO and treasurer until his promotion to president, COO, and treasurer in August 2017. Downing does not have an employment agreement, but that may change now that he is CEO, though Gentex typically does not have contracts with its executives. Kevin Nash, 44, joined Gentex in 1999 and worked his way up to the CFO role in February 2018. He is also treasurer. Four of the board's nine members joined since 2014 and two members joined in 2018. CEO Downing is not on the board, which we are fine with as it allows power to be more with the board than management, but we would not be surprised if Downing joined the board one day and even became chairman.

Management has achieved returns on invested capital far exceeding the cost of capital for many years, which we expect to continue. The company generates so much free cash flow (typically about 10% to 25% of sales) that until the HomeLink acquisition in September 2013, it had amassed cash and an investment portfolio, mostly consisting of stocks and government bonds, amounting to more than half of assets. Rather than piling up investments, we prefer to see an even higher dividend or more share repurchases when the stock is trading well below our fair value estimate. At a minimum, we'd like to see management repurchase shares to offset dilution from stock-based compensation.

A share repurchase in the third guarter of 2012 was the company's first since the fourth quarter of 2008. No shares were repurchased in 2013, but management spent \$30 million on buybacks in 2014, \$111.3 million in 2015, \$163.4 million in 2016, \$231.4 million in 2017, and \$591.8 million in 2018 including buyback of Bauer's shares. The diluted share count at year-end 2018 is down by nearly 9% since the end of 2015. Management bought back shares in 2018 at an average price per share of \$22.38 and cumulative buybacks for 2003-18 at \$1.54 billion were at an average of \$13.63 by our calculation.

We think management recognizes when its shares are cheap enough to buy back but, in the past, we wished it would have acted on that knowledge sooner. The leadership team put in place a few years ago is far more willing to buy back shares than we've seen under prior regimes; we just want Gentex to do it only when the stock is trading well below our fair value estimate. We think Bauer's capital-allocation preference was repurchases because of his dislike of the double taxation of dividends. The company only started paying a dividend after tax cuts in 2003 under President George W. Bush. We don't expect a major change in capital allocation under Downing, but a small amount of debt being a permanent part of the capital structure is more likely with Bauer retired.

Downing's first stamp on capital allocation came with a March 2018 announcement of a 10% dividend increase and a lowering of the target for cash and investments to \$525 million from \$700 million. These moves suggest to us that dividends and buybacks will remain part of capital allocation on a regular basis. March 2018 and March 2019 both saw announcements increasing the repurchase authorization. The plan does not expire and has 22.5 million shares of authorization left at the end of September.



Morningstar Rating Last Price \*\*

30.95 USD 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020 22:43. UTC

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019 19:09 LITC

1.35

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Vield % 1.49 30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Yield % Market Can (Bil) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry **Auto Parts**  Stewardshin Standard

## **Analyst Notes Archive**

## Auto Suppliers With Highest Exposure to the GM Strike; Maintaining Fair Value Estimates

Richard Hilgert, Sr. Eq. Analyst, 24 September 2019

Our covered auto-parts suppliers with the highest General Motors exposure include Lear (18%), Magna (15%), Aptiv (11%), and Tenneco (pro forma 11%), as measured by the percentage of 2018 revenue attributable to the automaker. All other suppliers in our coverage have less than 10% revenue exposure. The percentages are not limited to General Motors' North American operations, so strike-affected revenue is probably lower.

However, assuming supplier operations are on a just-in-time parts supply basis, revenue impact would be immediate. Using the percentages we have, total GM revenue exposure per day would roughly amount to \$10 million for Lear, \$17 million for Magna, \$4 million for Aptiv, and \$5 million for Tenneco. For comparison, each suppliers' total 2018 revenue was \$21.1 billion for Lear, \$40.8 billion for Magna, \$14.3 billion for Aptiv, and \$17.9 billion (pro forma) for Tenneco.

Once a settlement is reached, GM could recoup some of its lost production, if needed, depending on dealer inventory levels, which stood at an elevated 80 days as of Sept. 1 (the industry considers about 65 days as optimal). Even so, if the strike were to continue for several months, there could be an impact to our valuations but for now, we maintain our fair value estimates for 3-star narrow-moat Lear at \$122, 3-star no-moat Magna at \$61, 2-star narrow-moat Aptiv at \$67, and 5-star narrow-moat Tenneco at \$73. Long-term investors, in our opinion, should view any stock sell-off to 4 stars or better from the GM strike as an opportunity to own shares. For more details on the strike and the United Auto Workers, please see our Sept. 15 GM note on the union's strike on the company's U.S. operations, as well as our June 25 report "UAW Talks a Chance for Both Sides to Forge a Deeper Partnership.'

## Gentex Has Good Q3, but Q4 Will Take a Hit From **UAW Strike at GM**

David Whiston, Analyst, 18 October 2019

Gentex's third-quarter results give us no reason to change our \$23 fair value estimate. The company continues to outperform industry light-vehicle production even in

turbulent times. Diluted EPS rose 4.8% year over year to \$0.44, beating consensus by \$0.02. However, we calculate a \$0.02 benefit from share buybacks. Revenue grew 3.8% to \$477.8 million, beating consensus of \$474.4 million. This increase was despite industry global light-vehicle production down 3% in the quarter, reflecting Gentex's dominant auto-dimming mirror market share of over 90% and robust customer demand. The General Motors strike took about 2% off revenue. Management estimates a \$7 million-\$8 million weekly revenue hit from the strike; this caused a cut in 2019 guidance to \$1.84 billion-\$1.87 billion in revenue, from \$1.87 billion-\$1.90 billion, and gross margin at 36.6%-37%, from 36.5%-37.5%. This guidance assumes the strike lasts through October, which we think is reasonable. However, if the UAW's ratification vote, scheduled to end Oct. 25, rejects the tentative deal, we expect Gentex will not meet this guidance.

Gross margin grew 10 basis points year over year to 37.7%, which we consider a solid performance given a 110-basis-point headwind from tariffs from the China-U.S. trade war. Management called out a good product mix but also better-than-expected purchasing cost reductions and work by its team to reduce precious metal usage. These types of manufacturing efficiencies are in our view a key reason why Gentex can maintain its outstanding profit levels and leading market position and why management maintains its 2020 revenue guidance of 3%-8% growth from 2019, despite citing worsening 2020 light-vehicle production forecasts. With Brexit uncertainty and possible U.S. tariffs on EU autos, we think there is more downside risk than normal to the next year's outlook, but Gentex's fortress debt-free balance sheet makes us confident that the firm can withstand any bad news.

## Gentex Keeps Rolling Along to End 2019 Despite **Global Uncertainties**

David Whiston, Analyst, 31 January 2020

Gentex finished 2019 with a solid fourth guarter that shows its growth story is not near an end. Diluted EPS did decline year over year by 5% to \$0.39 while revenue fell 2%; however, both figures beat the Refinitiv consensus (\$0.02 EPS beat). We are not changing our fair value estimate but as always we will reassesses all modeling assumptions after Gentex files its 10-K. Management's 2020 guidance calls for as much as a nearly 8% rise in revenue over 2019's \$1.859 billion as the rollout of the high-priced full display mirror continues and auto dimming mirror penetration continues its gradual penetration



Morningstar Rating Last Price 30.95 USD  $\star\star$ 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

22:43. UTC

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019 19:09, UTC

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Yield % 1.35 1.49

30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Yield % Market Can (Bil) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry Auto Parts Stewardship Standard

increase. FDM full-year unit volume grew 89% over 2018 to 739,000 units while total company mirror volume rose 3% to 42.9 million. This 3% growth rate is impressive given management called out an approximate 6% decline in global light vehicle production. 2020 revenue guidance is also well above the industry's light vehicle production based on Gentex citing IHS' negative 1% forecast decline versus 2019 for the combined areas of North America, Europe, Japan, Korea, and China.

As long as the U.S. and Europe do not fall into recession we don't see major problems looming for Gentex this year, though the coronavirus in China may cause further production shutdowns beyond what the industry is already planning for in the first nine days of February. The start of a year also means Gentex starts its annual pricing battle when early in the year it incurs annual pricing reductions from its customers, as is customary in the auto industry. The company then, usually after first quarter, obtains pricing reductions from its suppliers as well as improves its cost structure via finding manufacturing efficiencies. Gentex is very good at this, which is one reason it can keep its gross margins in the upper 30% range.

# Gentex Corp GNTX ★Q 31 Jan 2020 02:00 UTC

31 Jan 2020 02:00 UTC 29.77 25.60

There is no one analyst in which a Quantitative Fair Value Estimate and Quantitative Star Rating are attributed to; however, Mr. Lee Davidson, Head of Quantitative Research for Morningstar, Inc., is responsible for overseeing the methodology that supports the quantitative fair value. As an employee of Morningstar, Inc., Mr. Davidson is guided by Morningstar, Inc.'s Code of Ethics and Personal Securities Trading Policy in carrying out his responsibilities. For information regarding Conflicts of Interests, visit http://global.morningstar.com/equitydisclosures

#### **Company Profile**

Gentex was founded in 1974 to produce smoke-detection equipment. The company sold its first glare-control interior mirror in 1982 and its first model using electrochromic technology in 1987. Automotive revenue is about 98% of total revenue, and the company is constantly developing new applications for the technology to remain on top. Sales from 2018 totaled about \$1.8 billion with 41.6 million mirrors shipped. The company is based in Zeeland, Michigan.

Quantitative Scores	Scores			
		All	Rel Sector	Rel Country
Quantitative Moat	Narrow	99	99	97
Valuation	Overvalued	2	1	3
Quantitative Uncertainty	Medium	99	100	97
Financial Health	Strong	96	89	96



Source: Morningstar Equity Research

Valuation	Current	5-Yr Avg	Sector Median	Country Median
Price/Quant Fair Value	1.21	1.01	0.80	0.83
Price/Earnings	18.6	15.5	16.2	20.1
Forward P/E	17.7	_	12.3	13.9
Price/Cash Flow	14.8	12.7	10.2	13.1
Price/Free Cash Flow	17.2	16.4	17.7	19.5
Trailing Dividend Yield %	1.49	1.87	2.46	2.35
Price/Book	4.1	3.0	1.6	2.4
Price/Sales	4.3	3.4	0.9	2.4
Drofitability			Sector	Country

Profitability	Current	5-Yr Avg	Sector Median	Country Median
Return on Equity %	22.9	20.3	12.2	12.9
Return on Assets %	20.4	16.7	5.4	5.2
Revenue/Employee (K)	327.4	323.4	566.3	325.9

Financial Health	Current	5-Yr Avg	Sector Median	Country Median
Distance to Default	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.5
Solvency Score	_	_	486.0	552.4
Assets/Equity	1.1	1.2	1.8	1.7
Long-Term Debt/Equity	_	_	0.2	0.4

Growth Per Share				
	1-Year	3-Year	5-Year	10-Year
Revenue %	2.2	5.9	9.4	11.4
Operating Income %	-2.9	3.5	10.8	16.7
Earnings %	14.9	14.5	16.0	22.1
Dividends %	-15.4	-0.5	3.3	4.4
Book Value %	-1.8	6.7	9.5	11.1
Stock Total Return %	42.7	14.1	13.7	13.2

Market Cap	
31 Jan 2020	
7,829.5 Mil	
7,020.0 14111	

Consumer Cyclical

Industry Auto Parts **Country of Domicile** 

USA United States

Price vs. Quan	titative Fair Va	lue						
2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 50 40 30 20 10	— Quantita — Total Ref — Sales/Sh — Forecast — Dividend	nare Range d Price Positiv	
25.2	8.3	-1.5	45.6	3.1		Total Return <sup>o</sup>	%	
12.7	-13.1	3.6	14.4	1.3		+/- Market (N	Morningstar US	Index)
1.78	1.81	2.13	1.57	1.49		Trailing Divid	end Yield %	
1.83	1.91	2.18	1.59	1.49		Forward Divid	lend Yield %	
16.4	16.6	12.1	17.5	18.7		Price/Earning	S	
3.5	3.5	3.0	4.0	4.3		Price/Revenu	е	
						Morningstar	Rating <sup>Q</sup>	
						****		
						***		

						*
<b>2014</b> 1,376 17.4	<b>2015</b> 1,544 12.2	<b>2016</b> 1,679 8.8	<b>2017</b> 1,795 6.9	<b>2018</b> 1,834 2.2	<b>TTM</b> 1,868 1.9	Financials (Fiscal Year in Mil) Revenue % Change
399	459	512	523	508	503	Operating Income
30.9	15.0	11.5	2.3	-2.9	-1.0	% Change
289	318	348	407	438	431	Net Income
327	352	471	501	552	538	Operating Cash Flow
-73	-98	-121	-104	-86	-76	Capital Spending
255	254	351	397	466	463	Free Cash Flow
18.5	16.4	20.9	22.1	25.4	24.8	% Sales
0.98	1.08	1.19	1.41	1.62	1.66	EPS
26.5	10.2	10.2	18.5	14.9	2.5	% Change
0.87	1.00	1.01	1.22	1.67	1.80	Free Cash Flow/Share
0.31	0.34	0.36	0.39	0.33	0.34	Dividends/Share
5.07	5.74	6.45	7.23	7.11	7.60	Book Value/Share
291,338	287,738	280,281	259,329	252,972	252,972	Shares Outstanding (K)
						Profitability
19.9	19.3	19.1	20.6	22.4	22.9	Return on Equity %
15.2	15.3	15.6	17.5	19.7	20.4	Return on Assets %
21.0	20.6	20.7	22.7	23.9	23.1	Net Margin %
0.73	0.74	0.75	0.77	0.83	0.88	Asset Turnover
1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	Financial Leverage
39.2	39.1	39.8	38.7	37.7	37.4	Gross Margin %
29.0	29.7	30.5	29.2	27.7	26.9	Operating Margin %
258	226	178	_	_	_	Long-Term Debt
1,571	1,723	1,910	2,050	1,862	1,921	Total Equity
3.8	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.8	Fixed Asset Turns

Quarterly Revenue & EPS								
Revenue (Mil)	Mar	Jun	Sep	Dec	Total			
2019	468.6	468.7	477.8	_	_			
2018	465.4	455.0	460.3	453.4	1,834.1			
2017	453.5	443.1	438.6	459.6	1,794.9			
2016	405.6	423.8	429.6	419.9	1,678.9			
Earnings Per Share ()								
2019	0.40	0.42	0.44	_	_			
2018	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.41	1.62			
2017	0.33	0.31	0.31	0.46	1.41			

0.30

0.32

0.31

1.19

Revenue Growth Year On Year %





0.28

2016

#### **Qualitative Equity Research Overview**

At the heart of our valuation system is a detailed projection of a company's future cash flows, resulting from our analysts' research. Analysts create custom industry and company assumptions to feed income statement, balance sheet, and capital investment assumptions into our globally standardized, proprietary discounted cash flow, or DCF, modeling templates. We use scenario analysis, in-depth competitive advantage analysis, and a variety of other analytical tools to augment this process. We believe this bottom-up, long-term, fundamentally based approach allows our analysts to focus on long-term business drivers, which have the greatest valuation impact, rather than short-term market noise.

Morningstar's equity research group ("we," "our") believes that a company's intrinsic worth results from the future cash flows it can generate. The Morningstar Rating for stocks identifies stocks trading at an uncertainty-adjusted discount or premium to their intrinsic worth—or fair value estimate, in Morningstar terminology. Five-star stocks sell for the biggest risk-adjusted discount to their fair values whereas 1-star stocks trade at premiums to their intrinsic worth.

Four key components drive the Morningstar rating: (1) our assessment of the firm's economic moat, (2) our estimate of the stock's fair value, (3) our uncertainty around that fair value estimate and (4) the current market price. This process ultimately culminates in our single-point star rating.

#### 1. Economic Moat

The concept of an economic moat plays a vital role not only in our qualitative assessment of a firm's long-term investment potential, but also in the actual calculation of our fair value estimates. An economic moat is a structural feature that allows a firm to sustain excess profits over a long period of time. We define excess economic profits as returns on invested capital (or ROIC) over and above our estimate of a firm's cost of capital, or weighted average cost of capital (or WACC). Without a moat, profits are more susceptible to competition. We have identified five sources of economic moats:

intangible assets, switching costs, network effect, cost advantage, and efficient scale.

Companies with a narrow moat are those we believe are more likely than not to achieve normalized excess returns for at least the next 10 years. Wide-moat companies are those in which we have very high confidence that excess returns will remain for 10 years, with excess returns more likely than not to remain for at least 20 years. The longer a firm generates economic profits, the higher its intrinsic value. We believe low-quality no-moat companies will see their normalized returns gravitate toward the firm's cost of capital more quickly than companies with moats.

To assess the direction of the underlying competitive advantages, analysts perform ongoing assessments of the moat trend. A firm's moat trend is positive in cases where we think its sources of competitive advantage are growing stronger; stable where we don't anticipate changes to competitive advantages over the next several years; or negative when we see signs of deterioration

All the moat and moat trend ratings undergo periodic review and any changes must be approved by the Morningstar Economic Moat Committee, comprised of senior members of Morningstar's equity research department.

#### 2. Estimated Fair Value

Combining our analysts' financial forecasts with the firm's economic moat helps us assess how long returns on invested capital are likely to exceed the firm's cost of capital. Returns of firms with a wide economic moat rating are assumed to fade to the perpetuity period over a longer period of time than the returns of narrow-moat firms, and both will fade slower than no-moat firms, increasing our estimate of their intrinsic value.

Our model is divided into three distinct stages:

#### Stage I: Explicit Forecast

In this stage, which can last five to 10 years, analysts make full financial statement forecasts, including items such as revenue, profit margins, tax rates, changes in working-capital accounts, and capital spending. Based on these projections, we calculate earnings before interest, after taxes, or EBI, and the net new investment, or NNI, to derive our annual free cash flow forecast

#### Stage II: Fade

The second stage of our model is the period it will take the company's return on new invested capital — the return on capital of the next dollar invested ("RONIC") to decline (or rise) to its cost of capital. During the Stage Il period, we use a formula to approximate cash flows in lieu of explicitly modeling the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement as we do in Stage I. The length of the second stage depends on the strength of the company's economic moat. We forecast this period to last anywhere from one year (for companies with no economic moat) to 10-15 years or more (for wide-moat companies). During this period, cash flows are forecast using four assumptions: an average growth rate for EBI over the period, a normalized investment rate, average return on new invested capital, or RONIC, and the number of years until perpetuity, when excess returns cease. The investment rate and return on new invested capital decline until the perpetuity stage is reached. In the case of firms that do not earn their cost of capital, we assume marginal ROICs rise to the firm's cost of capital (usually attributable to less reinvestment), and we may truncate the second stage.

#### Stage III: Perpetuity

Once a company's marginal ROIC hits its cost of capital, we calculate a continuing value, using a standard perpetuity formula. At perpetuity, we assume that any growth or decline or investment in the business neither creates nor destroys value and that any new investment provides a return in line with estimated WACC.

Because a dollar earned today is worth more than a dollar earned tomorrow, we discount our projections of cash flows in stages I, II, and III to arrive at a total present value of expected future cash flows. Because we are modeling free cash flow to the firm—representing cash available to provide a return to all capital providers—we discount future cash flows using the WACC, which is a weighted average of the costs of equity, debt, and preferred stock (and any other funding sources), using expected future proportionate long-term market-value weights.

# Morningstar Research Methodology for Valuing Companies Economic Moat Stewardship Financial Health Moat Trend Morningstar Fair Value Uncertainty Morningstar Fair Value Worningstar Fair Value Morningstar Fair Value Morningstar Fair Value Morningstar Rating™ For Stocks ★★★★

#### 3. Uncertainty Around That Fair Value Estimate

Morningstar's Uncertainty Rating captures a range of likely potential intrinsic values for a company and uses it to assign the margin of safety required before investing, which in turn explicitly drives our stock star rating system. The Uncertainty Rating represents the analysts' ability to bound the estimated value of the shares in a company around the fair value estimate, based on the characteristics of the business underlying the stock, including operating and financial leverage, sales sensitivity to the overall economy, product concentration, pricing power, and other company-specific factors.

Analysts consider at least two scenarios in addition to their base case: a bull case and a bear case. Assumptions are chosen such that the analyst believes there is a 25% probability that the company will perform better than the bull case, and a 25% probability that the company will perform worse than the bear case. The distance between the bull and bear cases is an important indicator of the uncertainty underlying the fair value estimate.

Our recommended margin of safety widens as our uncertainty of the estimated value of the equity increases. The more uncertain we are about the estimated value of the equity, the greater the discount we require relative to our estimate of the value of the firm before we would recommend the purchase of the shares. In addition, the uncertainty rating provides guidance in portfolio construction based on risk tolerance.

Our uncertainty ratings for our qualitative analysis are low, medium, high, very high, and extreme.


- ► Low—margin of safety for 5-star rating is a 20% discount and for 1-star rating is 25% premium.
- ► Medium—margin of safety for 5-star rating is a 30% discount and for 1-star rating is 35% premium.
- ► High—margin of safety for 5-star rating is a 40% discount and for 1-star rating is 55% premium.
- ➤ Very High—margin of safety for 5-star rating is a 50% discount and for 1-star rating is 75% premium.
- ► Extreme—margin of safety for 5-star rating is a 75% discount and for 1-star rating is 300% premium.

#### 4. Market Price

The market prices used in this analysis and noted in the report come from exchange on which the stock is listed, which we believe is a reliable source.

For more details about our methodology, please go to https://shareholders.morningstar.com.

#### Morningstar Equity Research Star Rating Methodology



#### **Morningstar Star Rating for Stocks**

Once we determine the fair value estimate of a stock, we compare it with the stock's current market price on a daily basis, and the star rating is automatically re-calculated at the market close on every day the market on which the stock is listed is open.

Please note, there is no predefined distribution of stars. That is, the percentage of stocks that earn 5 stars can fluctuate daily, so the star ratings, in the aggregate, can serve as a gauge of the broader market's valuation. When there are many 5-star stocks, the stock market as a whole is more undervalued, in our opinion, than when very few companies garner our highest rating.

We expect that if our base-case assumptions are true the market price will converge on our fair value estimate over time, generally within three years (although it is impossible to predict the exact time frame in which market prices may adjust).

Our star ratings are guideposts to a broad audience and individuals must consider their own specific investment goals, risk tolerance, tax situation, time horizon, income needs, and complete investment portfolio, among other factors.

The Morningstar Star Ratings for stocks are defined below:

- ★★★★ We believe appreciation beyond a fair riskadjusted return is highly likely over a multiyear time frame. The current market price represents an excessively pessimistic outlook, limiting downside risk and maximizing upside potential.
- $\star\star\star\star$  We believe appreciation beyond a fair risk-adjusted return is likely.
- ★★★ Indicates our belief that investors are likely to receive a fair risk-adjusted return (approximately cost of equity).
- ★★ We believe investors are likely to receive a less than fair risk-adjusted return.
- ★ Indicates a high probability of undesirable risk-adjusted returns from the current market price over a multiyear time frame, based on our analysis. The market is pricing in an excessively optimistic outlook, limiting upside potential and leaving the investor exposed to Capital loss.



#### Other Definitions

**Last Price:** Price of the stock as of the close of the market of the last trading day before date of the report.

Stewardship Rating: Represents our assessment of management's stewardship of shareholder capital, with particular emphasis on capital allocation decisions. Analysts consider companies' investment strategy and valuation, financial leverage, dividend and share buyback policies, execution, compensation, related party transactions, and accounting practices. Corporate governance practices are only considered if they've had a demonstrated impact on shareholder value. Analysts assign one of three ratings: "Exemplary," "Standard," and "Poor." Analysts judge stewardship from an equity holder's perspective. Ratings are determined on an absolute basis. Most companies will receive a Standard rating, and this is the default rating in the absence of evidence that managers have made exceptionally strong or poor capital allocation decisions.

Quantitative Valuation: Using the below terms, intended to denote the relationship between the security's Last Price and Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate for that security.

- ► Undervalued: Last Price is below Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate.
- ► Fairly Valued: Last Price is in line with Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate.
- Overvalued: Last Price is above Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate.

#### **Risk Warning**

Please note that investments in securities are subject to market and other risks and there is no assurance or guarantee that the intended investment objectives will be achieved. Past performance of a security may or may not be sustained in future and is no indication of future performance. A security investment return and an investor's principal value will fluctuate so that, when redeemed, an investor's shares may be worth more or less than their original cost. A security's current investment performance may be lower or higher than the investment performance noted within the report. Morningstar's Uncertainty Rating serves as a useful data point with respect to sensitivity analysis of the assumptions used in our determining a fair value price.

#### Quantitative Equity Reports Overview

The quantitative report on equities consists of data, statistics and quantitative equity ratings on equity securities. Morningstar, Inc.'s quantitative equity ratings are forward looking and are generated by a statistical model that is based on Morningstar Inc.'s analyst-driven equity ratings and quantitative statistics. Given the nature of the

quantitative report and the quantitative ratings, there is no one analyst in which a given report is attributed to; however, Mr. Lee Davidson, Head of Quantitative Research for Morningstar, Inc., is responsible for overseeing the methodology that supports the quantitative equity ratings used in this report. As an employee of Morningstar, Inc., Mr. Davidson is guided by Morningstar, Inc.'s Code of Ethics and Personal Securities Trading Policy in carrying out his responsibilities.

#### **Quantitative Equity Ratings**

Morningstar's quantitative equity ratings consist of:

- (i) Quantitative Fair Value Estimate
- (ii) Quantitative Star Rating
- (iii) Quantitative Uncertainty
- (iv) Quantitative Economic Moat
- (v) Quantitative Financial Health (collectively the "Quantitative Ratings").

The Quantitative Ratings are calculated daily and derived from the analyst-driven ratings of a company's peers as determined by statistical algorithms. Morningstar, Inc. (""Morningstar," "we," "our") calculates Quantitative Ratings for companies whether it already provides analyst ratings and qualitative coverage. In some cases, the Quantitative Ratings may differ from the analyst ratings because a company's analyst-driven ratings can significantly differ from other companies in its peer group.

Quantitative Fair Value Estimate: Intended to represent Morningstar's estimate of the per share dollar amount that a company's equity is worth today. Morningstar calculates the quantitative fair value estimate using a statistical model derived from the fair value estimate Morningstar's equity analysts assign to companies. Please go to <a href="https://shareholders.morningstar.com">https://shareholders.morningstar.com</a> for information about fair value estimates Morningstar's equity analysts assign to

Quantitative Economic Moat: Intended to describe the strength of a firm's competitive position. It is calculated using an algorithm designed to predict the Economic Moat rating a Morningstar analyst would assign to the stock. The rating is expressed as Narrow, Wide, or None.

- Narrow: assigned when the probability of a stock receiving a "Wide Moat" rating by an analyst is greater than 70% but less than 99%.
- ► Wide: assigned when the probability of a stock receiving a "Wide Moat" rating by an analyst is greater than 99%.
- None: assigned when the probability of an analyst receiving a "Wide Moat" rating by an analyst is less than 70%.

**Quantitative Star Rating:** Intended to be the summary rating based on the combination of our Quantitative Fair

Value Estimate, current market price, and the Quantitative Uncertainty Rating. The rating is expressed as 1-Star, 2-Star, 3-Star, 4-Star, and 5-Star.

 $\bigstar$ : the stock is overvalued with a reasonable margin of safety.

Log (Quant FVE/Price)<-1\*Quantitative Uncertainty

- ★★: the stock is somewhat overvalued. Log (Quant FVE/Price) between (-1\*Quantitative Uncertainty, -0.5\*Quantitative Uncertainty)
- ★★★: the stock is approximately fairly valued. Log (Quant FVE/Price) between (-0.5\*Quantitative Uncertainty, 0.5\*Quantitative Uncertainty)
- ★★★★: the stock is somewhat undervalued. Log (Quant FVE/Price) between (0.5\*Quantitative Uncertainty, 1\*Quantitative Uncertainty)
- ★★★★: the stock is undervalued with a reasonable margin of safety. Log (Quant FVE/Price) >1\*Quantitative Uncertainty

Quantitative Uncertainty: Intended to represent
Morningstar's level of uncertainty about the accuracy of the
quantitative fair value estimate. Generally, the lower the
quantitative Uncertainty, the narrower the potential range
of outcomes for that particular company. The rating is
expressed as Low, Medium, High, Very High, and Extreme.

- ► Low: the interquartile range for possible fair values is less than 10%
- ► Medium: the interquartile range for possible fair values is less than 15% but greater than 10%.
- ► High: the interquartile range for possible fair values is less than 35% but greater than 15%.
- ► Very High: the interquartile range for possible fair values is less than 80% but greater than 35%.
- ► Extreme: the interquartile range for possible fair values is greater than 80%.

**Quantitative Financial Health:** Intended to reflect the probability that a firm will face financial distress in the near future. The calculation uses a predictive model designed to anticipate when a company may default on its financial obligations. The rating is expressed as Weak, Moderate, and Strong.

- ► Weak: assigned when Quantitative Financial Health <0.2
- ► Moderate: assigned when Quantitative Financial Health is between 0.2 and 0.7
- ► Strong: assigned when Quantitative Financial Health >0.7



#### **Other Definitions**

**Last Close:** Price of the stock as of the close of the market of the last trading day before date of the report.

Quantitative Valuation: Using the below terms, intended to denote the relationship between the security's Last Price and Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate for that security.

- ► Undervalued: Last Price is below Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate.
- ► Fairly Valued: Last Price is in line with Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate.
- Overvalued: Last Price is above Morningstar's quantitative fair value estimate.

This Report has not been made available to the issuer of the security prior to publication.

#### **Risk Warning**

Please note that investments in securities are subject to market and other risks and there is no assurance or guarantee that the intended investment objectives will be achieved. Past performance of a security may or may not be sustained in future and is no indication of future performance. A security investment return and an investor's principal value will fluctuate so that, when redeemed, an investor's shares may be worth more or less than their original cost. A security's current investment performance may be lower or higher than the investment performance noted within the report.

The quantitative equity ratings are not statements of fact. Morningstar does not guarantee the completeness or accuracy of the assumptions or models used in determining the quantitative equity ratings. In addition, there is the risk that the price target will not be met due to such things as unforeseen changes in demand for the company's products, changes in management, technology, economic development, interest rate development, operating and/or material costs, competitive pressure, supervisory law, exchange rate, and tax rate. For investments in foreign markets there are further risks, generally based on exchange rate changes or changes in political and social conditions.

A change in the fundamental factors underlying the quantitative equity ratings can mean that the valuation is subsequently no longer accurate.

For more information about Morningstar's quantitative methodology, please visit http://global.morningstar.com/equitydisclosures.



Morningstar Rating Last Price 30.95 USD \*\* 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019 19:09, UTC

1.35

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Yield % 1.49

30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Yield % 1.49 30 Jan 2020

Market Can (Bil) 7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry **Auto Parts**  Stewardshin Standard

#### **General Disclosure**

22:43. UTC

The analysis within this report is prepared by the person (s) noted in their capacity as an analyst for Morningstar's equity research group. The equity research group consists of various Morningstar, Inc. subsidiaries ("Equity Research Group)". In the United States, that subsidiary is Morningstar Research Services LLC, which is registered with and governed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The opinions expressed within the report are given in good faith, are as of the date of the report and are subject to change without notice. Neither the analyst nor Equity Research Group commits themselves in advance to whether and in which intervals updates to the report are expected to be made. The written analysis and Morningstar Star Rating for stocks are statements of opinions; they are not statements of fact.

The Equity Research Group believes its analysts make a reasonable effort to carefully research information contained in the analysis. The information on which the analysis is based has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable such as, for example, the company's financial statements filed with a regulator, company website, Bloomberg and any other the relevant press sources. Only the information obtained from such sources is made available to the issuer who is the subject of the analysis, which is necessary to properly reconcile with the facts. Should this sharing of information result in considerable changes, a statement of that fact will be noted within the report. While the Equity Research Group has obtained data, statistics and information from sources it believes to be reliable, neither the Equity Research Group nor Morningstar, Inc. performs an audit or seeks independent verification of any of the data, statistics, and information it receives.

#### **General Quantitative Disclosure**

The Quantitative Equity Report ("Report") is derived data, statistics and information within Morningstar, Inc.'s database as of the date of the Report and is subject to change without notice. The Report is for informational purposes only, intended for financial professionals and/or sophisticated investors ("Users") and should not be the sole piece of information used by such Users or their clients in making an investment decision. The quantitative equity ratings noted the Report are provided in good faith, are as of the date of





the Report and are subject to change. While Morningstar has obtained data, statistics and information from sources it believes to be reliable, Morningstar does not perform an audit or seeks independent verification of any of the data, statistics, and information it receives.

The quantitative equity ratings are not a market call, and do not replace the User or User's clients from conducting their own due-diligence on the security. The quantitative equity rating is not a suitability assessment; such assessments take into account may factors including a person's investment objective, personal and financial situation, and risk tolerance all of which are factors the quantitative equity rating statistical model does not and did not consider.

Prices noted with the Report are the closing prices on the last stock-market trading day before the publication date stated, unless another point in time is explicitly stated.

## General Disclosure (applicable to both Quantitative and Qualitative Research)

Unless otherwise provided in a separate agreement, recipients accessing this report may only use it in the country in which the Morningstar distributor is based. Unless stated otherwise, the original distributor of the report is Morningstar Research Services LLC, a U.S.A. domiciled financial institution.

This report is for informational purposes only and has no regard to the specific investment objectives,

financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. This publication is intended to provide information to assist institutional investors in making their own investment decisions, not to provide investment advice to any specific investor. Therefore, investments discussed and recommendations made herein may not be suitable for all investors: recipients must exercise their own independent judgment as to the suitability of such investments and recommendations in the light of their own investment objectives, experience, taxation status and financial position.

The information, data, analyses and opinions presented herein are not warranted to be accurate, correct, complete or timely. Unless otherwise provided in a separate agreement, neither Morningstar, Inc. or the Equity Research Group represents that the report contents meet all of the presentation and/or disclosure standards applicable in the jurisdiction the recipient is located.

Except as otherwise required by law or provided for in a separate agreement, the analyst, Morningstar, Inc. and the Equity Research Group and their officers, directors and employees shall not be responsible or liable for any trading decisions, damages or other losses resulting from, or related to, the information, data, analyses or opinions within the report. The Equity Research Group encourages recipients of this report to read all relevant issue documents (e.g., prospectus) pertaining to the security concerned, including without limitation, information relevant to its investment objectives, risks, and costs before making an



Morningstar Rating Last Price \*\* 30.95 USD 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

professional.

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019

Trailing Dividend Yield % 1.49

30 Jan 2020

Price/Fair Value

1.35

Forward Dividend Vield % Market Can (Ril) 1.49 30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry **Auto Parts**  Stewardshin Standard

19:09 LITC 22:43. UTC

investment decision and when deemed necessary, to seek the advice of a legal, tax, and/or accounting

The Report and its contents are not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Morningstar, Inc. or its affiliates to any registration or licensing requirements in such jurisdiction.

Where this report is made available in a language other than English and in the case of inconsistencies between the English and translated versions of the report, the English version will control and supersede any ambiguities associated with any part or section of a report that has been issued in a foreign language. Neither the analyst, Morningstar, Inc., or the Equity Research Group guarantees the accuracy of the translations.

This report may be distributed in certain localities, countries and/or jurisdictions ("Territories") by independent third parties or independent intermediaries and/or distributors ("Distributors"). Such Distributors are not acting as agents or representatives of the analyst, Morningstar, Inc. or the Equity Research Group. In Territories where a Distributor distributes our report, the Distributor is solely responsible for complying with all applicable regulations, laws, rules, circulars, codes and guidelines established by local and/or regional regulatory bodies, including laws in connection with the distribution third-party research reports.

## Conflicts of Interest:

- No interests are held by the analyst with respect to the security subject of this investment research report. - Morningstar, Inc. may hold a long position in the security subject of this investment research report that exceeds 0.5% of the total issued share capital of the security. To determine if such is the case, please click http://msi.morningstar.com and http://mdi.morningstar.com.
- Analysts' compensation is derived from Morningstar, Inc.'s overall earnings and consists of salary, bonus and in some cases restricted stock.

- Neither Morningstar, Inc. or the Equity Research Group receives commissions for providing research nor do they charge companies to be rated.
- Neither Morningstar, Inc. or the Equity Research Group is a market maker or a liquidity provider of the security noted within this report.
- Neither Morningstar, Inc. or the Equity Research Group has been a lead manager or co-lead manager over the previous 12-months of any publicly disclosed offer of financial instruments of the issuer.
- Morningstar, Inc.'s investment management group does have arrangements with financial institutions to provide portfolio management/investment advice some of which an analyst may issue investment research reports on. However, analysts do not have authority over Morningstar's investment management business arrangements nor allow employees from the investment management group to participate or influence the analysis or opinion prepared by them.
- Morningstar, Inc. is a publically traded company (Ticker Symbol: MORN) and thus a financial institution the security of which is the subject of this report may own more than 5% of Morningstar, Inc.'s total outstanding shares. Please access Morningstar, Inc.'s proxy statement, "Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management" section https: //shareholders.morningstar.com/investor-relations/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx
- Morningstar, Inc. may provide the product issuer or its related entities with services or products for a fee and on an arms' length basis including software products and licenses, research and consulting services, data services, licenses to republish our ratings and research in their promotional material, event sponsorship and website advertising.

Further information on Morningstar, Inc.'s conflict of interest policies is available from http://global.morningstar.com/equitydisclosures. Also, please note analysts are subject to the CFA Institute's Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct.

For a list of securities which the Equity Research Group

currently covers and provides written analysis on please contact your local Morningstar office. In addition, for historical analysis of securities covered, including their fair value estimate, please contact your local office.

For Recipients in Australia: This Report has been issued and distributed in Australia by Morningstar Australasia Pty Ltd (ABN: 95 090 665 544; ASFL: 240892). Morningstar Australasia Pty Ltd is the provider of the general advice ('the Service') and takes responsibility for the production of this report. The Service is provided through the research of investment products. To the extent the Report contains general advice it has been prepared without reference to an investor's objectives, financial situation or needs. Investors should consider the advice in light of these matters and, if applicable, the relevant Product Disclosure Statement before making any decision to invest. Refer to our Financial Services Guide (FSG) for more information at http://www.morningstar.com.au/fsg.pdf

For Recipients in Canada: This research is not prepared subject to Canadian disclosure requirements.

For Recipients in Hong Kong: The Report is distributed by Morningstar Investment Management Asia Limited, which is regulated by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission to provide services to professional investors only. Neither Morningstar Investment Management Asia Limited, nor its representatives, are acting or will be deemed to be acting as an investment advisor to any recipients of this information unless expressly agreed to by Morningstar Investment Management Asia Limited. For enquiries regarding this research, please contact a Morningstar Investment Management Asia Limited Licensed Representative at http://global.morningstar.com/equitydisclosures.

For Recipients in India: This Investment Research is issued by Morningstar Investment Adviser India Private Limited. Morningstar Investment Adviser India Private Limited is registered with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Registration number INA000001357) and provides investment advice and research. Morningstar Investment Adviser India Private Limited has not been the subject of any disciplinary action by



Morningstar Rating Last Price 30.95 USD \*\* 30 Jan 2020 30 Jan 2020

22:43. UTC

Fair Value Estimate 23.00 USD 19 Jul 2019

19:09, UTC

1.35

Price/Fair Value Trailing Dividend Yield % 1.49

30 Jan 2020

Forward Dividend Vield % Market Can (Ril) 1.49

30 Jan 2020

7.83 30 Jan 2020

Industry **Auto Parts**  Stewardshin Standard

SEBI or any other legal/regulatory body. Morningstar Investment Adviser India Private Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Morningstar Investment Management LLC. In India, Morningstar Investment Adviser India Private Limited has one associate, Morningstar India Private Limited, which provides data related services, financial data analysis and software development.

The Research Analyst has not served as an officer, director or employee of the fund company within the last 12 months, nor has it or its associates engaged in market making activity for the fund company.

\*The Conflicts of Interest disclosure above also applies to relatives and associates of Manager Research Analysts in India # The Conflicts of Interest disclosure above also applies to associates of Manager Research Analysts in India. The terms and conditions on which Morningstar Investment Adviser India Private Limited offers Investment Research to clients, varies from client to client, and are detailed in the respective client agreement.

For recipients in Japan: The Report is distributed by Ibbotson Associates Japan, Inc., which is regulated by Financial Services Agency. Neither Ibbotson Associates Japan, Inc., nor its representatives, are acting or will be deemed to be acting as an investment advisor to any recipients of this information.

For recipients in Singapore: This Report is distributed by Morningstar Investment Adviser Singapore Pte Limited, which is licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore to provide financial advisory services in Singapore. Investors should consult a financial adviser regarding the suitability of any investment product, taking into account their specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs, before making any investment decisions.