Berkshire Hathaway's expanding cash hoard raises the prospects of a one-time special dividend.

There were few big surprises in wide-moat-rated Berkshire Hathaway's first-quarter 13-F filing. The company already announced in mid-February the sale of 35 million shares of Phillips 66 common stock for $3.3 billion in a private transaction with the oil and gas company. CEO Warren Buffett also alluded recently to the purchase of 74.2 million additional shares of Apple for an estimated $12.5 billion, which lifted the tech giant to more than one fifth of Berkshire's equity portfolio, noting that the insurer eliminated its remaining stake in IBM as well (for an estimated $314 million).

Berkshire also made large additions to existing stakes in Monsanto and Teva Pharmaceuticals, increasing its holdings in the former by more than 60% (acquiring an additional 7.3 million shares of the agricultural products firm for an estimated $850 million) and more than doubling its stake in the latter (picking up 21.7 million more shares of the generic drug manufacturer for an estimated $390 million). Other purchases during the quarter included 3.7 million shares of US Bancorp, 1.4 million shares of Bank of New York Mellon, and 0.5 million shares of Delta Air Line (for an estimated $197 million, $73 million and $27 million, respectively).

While we knew about Berkshire's trimming of its Wells Fargo stake (selling 1.7 million shares for an estimated $97 million during the period) to keep its holdings below 10% of the bank's total outstanding shares, we were surprised to see the insurer sell more than 80% of its position in Verisk Analytics (for an estimated $128 million), while also eliminating its remaining stake in Graham Holdings (for an estimated $62 million). As for the remaining sales, Berkshire sold 0.3 million shares of Charter Communications, 1.9 million shares of Liberty Global PLC, 0.5 million shares of United Continental, and 0.2 million shares of Sanofi-Aventis (for an estimated $86 million, $66 million, $35 million and $7 million, respectively).

Investment Thesis 01/19/2018

We think two big concerns—a belief that Berkshire Hathaway's size will prevent it from growing at a decent clip in the future and the worry that company's shares will get pummeled once Warren Buffett no longer runs the show—have not only kept some investors on the sidelines but also kept the company's shares from expanding much beyond 1.5 times book value per share since the global equity markets bottomed out during the 2008-09 financial crisis.

While we believe Berkshire is unlikely to consistently increase its book value per share at a double-digit rate—something that happened six times during the past decade—we think it will continue to increase book value per share at a high-single-
digit to low-double-digit rate of growth. This will leave results solidly and consistently above Berkshire's cost of capital, which is what we've come to expect from companies with wide economic moats.

As for succession planning, we expect Buffett's three main roles—chairman, CEO, and investment manager—to be split after his retirement. Our long-standing view has been that Buffett's son, Howard Buffett, will serve as nonexecutive chairman and that Ted Weschler and Todd Combs will serve as co-investment managers of Berkshire's investment portfolio. We think there are two fine candidates for the CEO role—Ajit Jain and Greg Abel—both of whom would bring unique insights to the role; our preference would be to have Jain take control of all of Berkshire's insurance operations, while Abel (who has experience with both operations and acquisitions) fills the role of chief capital allocator.

With investment opportunities few and far between, the company continues to build up large amounts of cash on its balance sheet, which we think (absent sizable investment opportunities) should be dedicated to dividends and share repurchases. While Berkshire's share-repurchase policy is well known, we believe the firm could comfortably return one third of its annual free cash flow to shareholders. At the very least, the firm should consider a large one-time special dividend, returning a decent amount of excess cash to shareholders in the near to medium term.

**Economic Moat 01/19/2018**

Berkshire's wide economic moat is more than just a sum of its parts, although the parts that make up the whole are fairly moaty in their own regard. The company's insurance operations—Geico, General Re, Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, and Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group—continue to be important contributors to the overall business. Not only do the insurance operations (sans the investment in Kraft Heinz) generally account for around one third of Berkshire's pretax earnings (and our estimate of the company's fair value), but they also generate low-cost float—the temporary cash holdings that arise from premiums being collected in advance of future claims, which is a major source of funding for investments. That said, from an economic moat perspective, we don't believe the insurance industry is particularly conducive to the development of sustainable competitive advantages. While there are some quality companies operating in the industry (with Berkshire having some of the best operators in the different segments where it competes), the product that insurers sell is basically a commodity, with excess returns being difficult to achieve on a consistent basis.

Buyers of insurance are not inclined to pay a premium for brands, and the products themselves are easily replicable. Competition among insurance firms is fierce, and participants have been known to slash prices or simply undercut competitors to gain market share. Insurance is also one of the few industries where the cost of goods sold (signified by claims) may not be known for years, providing an incentive for companies to sacrifice long-term profitability in favor of near-term growth. In reinsurance, this dynamic can be even more pronounced, as losses in this business tend to be large in nature and may not be realized for years after a policy is written. Insurers can, however, develop sustainable cost advantages by either focusing on less commodified areas of the market or by developing efficient and/or scalable distribution platforms. What they can't do is gain a sustainable competitive advantage through investing, even when gains are the result of the investing prowess of someone like Buffett. We believe insurers that consistently achieve positive underwriting profitability are better bets in the long run, as insurance profitability tends to be more sustainable than investment income.

Geico has made strides with its direct-selling operations, moving from a position as the fourth-largest private auto insurer in the U.S. at the end of 2007 (with 7% of the market) to the second-largest underwriter at the end of 2016 (with a 12% share). Much like its closest competitor, Progressive, Geico has set itself apart from the rest of the industry by its scale in the direct-response channel. While scaling is typically difficult for insurance companies, personal line insurers like Geico and Progressive
have been better at spreading fixed costs over a wider base, as their business models
do not require as much human capital and specialized underwriters as other
insurance lines. This has been reflected in Geico's expense ratio, which over the past
five calendar years has averaged around 17%, leaving it more than 700 basis points
below the industry average and around 400 basis points better than Progressive.
Geico has, however, trailed its closest peer on an underwriting basis, allowing
Progressive to produce a combined ratio of 94% on average the past five calendar
years, compared with Geico at 96%. Given the similarity in their operations, though,
as well as the level and consistency of their profitability, we think that Geico, much
like Progressive, has a narrow economic moat around its operations.

We do not believe Berkshire's two reinsurance businesses--General Re and BHRG--
have economic moats. For a premium, reinsurers assume all or part of an insurance
or reinsurance policy written by another insurer. While any insurance company can
underwrite reinsurance, a handful of larger companies--Munich Re, Swiss Re,
Hannover Re, Lloyd's, and Berkshire Hathaway--hold sway over the lion's share of the
global reinsurance market. The policies underwritten by reinsurers often contain large
long-tail risks that few companies have the capacity to endure and, when priced
appropriately, can generate favorable long-term returns. That said, reinsurers
compete almost exclusively on price and capital strength, making it almost impossible
to build structural cost advantages. More important, losses in the reinsurance market
are lumpy and may not be realized for years after a policy is written, magnifying the
importance of disciplined and accurate underwriting skills. While Berkshire's
reinsurance arms are unique in that they have the luxury of walking away from
business when an appropriate premium cannot be obtained--something their peers
cannot always do--their underwriting profitability has been less consistent (due to the
nature of the risks they are underwriting) and much narrower than Berkshire's other
insurance businesses. The company sticks with reinsurance because it generates
large amounts of float that can be invested for longer periods of time than short-tail
lines like auto insurance. While our standard view on reinsurance is that firms
operating in this segment cannot carve out economic moats, we think Berkshire's two
reinsurance arms have come closer than most.

We believe BHPG, which has been Berkshire's most profitable insurance business
during the past decade, benefits from a narrow economic moat around its operations.
What is all the more remarkable about this is the fact that BHPG is a conglomeration
of multiple insurance operations--including National Indemnity's primary group,
that offer coverage as varied as workers' compensation and commercial auto and
property coverage. It is also where the company's Berkshire Hathaway Specialty
Insurance business resides. Formed in June 2013, this business is focused on U.S.
excess and surplus lines, looking to take advantage of the growing demand for
tailored insurance. We view this as a net positive for Berkshire's insurance operations
overall, as we've long believed that insurers that are able to focus on the least
commodified areas of the insurance market, such as excess and surplus lines, are
much more likely to generate consistent underwriting profitability.

Of the more than 70 noninsurance businesses that make up the remainder of
Berkshire's operating subsidiaries, Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Berkshire
Hathaway Energy are the next two largest contributors to the firm's profitability and
overall value, typically generating around 30% of pretax earnings (and our fair value
estimate) for the firm. The most interesting thing about these two particular
businesses is that neither of them was a major contributor to Berkshire's pretax
earnings a decade ago. Buffett's shift into such debt-heavy, capital-intensive
businesses as railroads and utilities has represented a marked departure from many
of Berkshire's other acquisitions over the years, which have tended to require less
ongoing capital investment and have had little to no debt. By definition, these higher-
capital businesses will have lower returns than the asset-light businesses Berkshire
has acquired over the years. That said, were Buffett to focus on buying more asset-
light companies with fewer capital reinvestment needs, it would leave his successors
with even greater levels of cash to reinvest longer term. During 2014-16, the firm
generated an average of $17.3 billion annually in free cash flow and by our estimates
was on pace to generate upward of $25 billion in free cash flow during 2017. The
amount of excess cash that Buffett would have needed to find a home for would have been meaningfully higher had Berkshire purchased similar-size companies such as BNSF and BHE with similar cash flow profiles that were not investing more than $4 billion each on average in their own property and equipment the past five years.

With BNSF, which was acquired in full in February 2010, Berkshire picked up a Class I railroad operator—an industry designation for a large operator with an extensive system of interconnected rails, yards, terminals, and expansive fleets of motive power and rolling stock. We believe the North American Class I railroads benefit from colossal barriers to entry because of their established, practically impossible-to-replicate networks of rights of way and continuously welded steel rail. While barges, ships, aircraft, and trucks also haul freight, railroads are by far the lowest-cost option when no waterway connects the origin and destination, especially for freight with low value per unit weight. That said, customers have few choices and thus wield limited buyer power, with most Class I railroads operating as duopolies and some being a monopoly supplier to the end client in many markets. This provides the major North American Class I railroads with efficient scale. Believing that railroad operators like BNSF will continue to leverage their competitive advantages of low cost and efficient scale to generate returns on invested capital in excess of their cost of capital over the long run, we have awarded them wide moat ratings.

As for Berkshire Hathaway Energy, which Buffett built up through investments in MidAmerican Energy (supplanting a 76% equity stake taken in early 2000 with additional purchases that have raised its interest to 90.2%), PacifiCorp (acquired in full during 2005), NV Energy (acquired in full at the end of 2013), and AltaLink (acquired in full at the end of 2014), we think the business overall is endowed with a narrow economic moat. While BHE has picked up pipeline assets—which have wide-moat characteristics—the majority of its revenue and profitability (and ongoing capital investment) are driven by its three main regulated utilities: MidAmerican Energy, PacifiCorp, and NV Energy. We think that regulated utilities cannot establish more than a narrow moat around their businesses, even with their difficult-to-replicate networks of power generation, transmission, and distribution, given that their rates, as well as their returns, are set by state and federal regulators.

While Berkshire's manufacturing, service, and retailing operations are generally the next-largest contributor to pretax earnings as well as our overall estimate of the value of the firm, they comprise a wide array of businesses operating in more than a handful of different industries. Unlike BNSF and BHE, both of which file quarterly and annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission, there is little financial information available on the firms operating in this segment. For past deals like Lubrizol and Precision Castparts, we've generally had a good sense of the operating profitability and moat characteristics of the operations (with both firms viewed as having narrow economic moats), but once they were folded into the manufacturing, service, and retailing segment, it became more difficult to conduct a proper assessment. Given Buffett’s penchant for acquiring companies that have consistent earnings power, generate above-average returns on capital, hold little debt, and are run by solid management teams, though, we believe the businesses that make up the segment are collectively endowed with a narrow economic moat. The same could be said for Berkshire’s finance and financial products segment, which includes Clayton Homes (manufactured housing and finance), CORT Business Services (furniture rental), Marmon (rail car and other transportation equipment manufacturing, repair and leasing), and XTRA (over-the-road trailer leasing). While the recession (and collapse of the housing market) that followed the 2008-09 financial crisis affected many of these businesses, they all benefited from being under the Berkshire umbrella, which allowed them to recover on their own terms.

With Buffett running Berkshire on a decentralized basis, the managers of the company's operating subsidiaries are empowered to make their own business decisions. In most cases, the managers running Berkshire's subsidiaries are the same individuals who originally sold their firms to Buffett, leaving them with a vested interest in the businesses they are running. Barring a truly disruptive event in their industries, we expect these firms to continue to have the same advantages that attracted Buffett to them in the first place. That does not mean that there won't be
subsidiaries whose competitive advantages diminish over time (exemplified by the demise of the textile manufacturer that Berkshire Hathaway derives its own name from), it's just that the large collection of moaty firms that reside within Berkshire's manufacturing, service, and retailing operations, as well as its finance and financial products division, is more likely to maintain a narrow economic moat in aggregate, even as a few firms along the way succumb to changing competitive dynamics within their industries.

**Valuation 01/19/2018**

We've increased our fair value estimate for Berkshire Hathaway to $220 per Class B share, which is equivalent to just over 1.5 times our estimate of Berkshire's year-end 2017 book value per Class B share of $143.50. With book value expected to grow at a high-single-digit rate this year and next, our fair value estimate (which is derived using a 21% statutory U.S. federal income tax rate) is equivalent to 1.4 and 1.3 times our estimates for book value at the end of 2018 and 2019, respectively. We use a sum-of-the-parts methodology to derive our fair value estimate. Our valuation for Berkshire's insurance operations has increased to $73 per Class B share, due primarily to strong market gains in the segment's equity portfolio during 2017 and forecast continued strength in 2018, as well as the impact of the reduction in the corporate income tax rate. Our five-year forecast, which includes both reported and forecast catastrophe-related losses, continues to include an improvement in underwriting results, with earned premium growth averaging 9.2% and the insurance group's combined ratio averaging 97.9% annually during 2017-21. Berkshire's investment in Kraft Heinz, which we value separately from the insurance operations, is worth $11 per Class B share. Our fair value estimate for BNSF increased to $48 per Class B share. This valuation assumes a more normalized volume outlook for the railroad following a strong year of recovery (especially for coal) during 2017, as well as a lower corporate income tax rate. We expect unit volume to increase at a 2.0% CAGR during 2017-21, with freight revenue expanding 4.4% on average annually and the company's operating ratio reaching 58% by the end of 2021. For Berkshire's utilities and energy division, which will see less of a benefit from a lower statutory tax rate (as any savings will get passed on to customers), our fair value estimate remains in place at $17 per Class B share. Our valuation for Berkshire's manufacturing, service, and retail operations increased to $64 per Class B share due to the lower corporate tax rate and slightly revised forecasts for revenue (growing 5.3% annually during 2017-21 compared with 5.0% previously) and profitability (with pretax operating margins expanding 20-25 basis points annually over the course of our projection period). For the firm's finance and financial products division, our fair value estimate is equivalent to $7 per Class B share.

**Risk 01/19/2018**

Berkshire is exposed to large potential losses through its insurance operations. While the company believes its catastrophe and supercatastrophe underwriting can generate solid long-term results, the volatility of these business lines, which have the potential to subject the firm to especially large losses, tends to be high. Berkshire maintains much higher capital levels than almost all other insurers, though, which we believe mitigates some of this risk.

Several of the firm's key businesses--insurance, energy generation and distribution, and rail transport--operate in industries that are subject to higher degrees of regulatory oversight, which could have an impact on future business combinations, as well as the setting of rates that are charged to customers. On top of that, many of the firm's noninsurance operations are exposed to the cyclicality of the economy, with results typically suffering during economic slowdowns and recessions.

Berkshire is also exposed to foreign currency, equity price, and credit default risk through its various investments and operating companies. The company's derivative contracts, in particular, could affect the firm's earnings and capital position, especially during more volatile markets, given that they are recorded at fair value and are,
therefore, updated periodically to reflect the ongoing changes in the value of these contracts.

Berkshire depends on two key employees, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, for almost all of its investment and capital-allocation decisions. With Buffett turning 87 in August 2017 and Munger turning 94 in January 2018, it has become increasingly likely that our valuation horizon will end up exceeding their life spans, with the quality of investment returns and capital allocation likely to deteriorate under new management.

Management 01/19/2018

Warren Buffett has been chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway since 1970. Charlie Munger has served as vice chairman since 1978. Berkshire has two classes of common stock, with Class B shares holding 1/1,500th of the economic rights of Class A shares and only 1/10,000th of the voting rights. Buffett is Berkshire's largest shareholder, with a 31.9% voting stake and a 17.2% economic interest in the firm. He has been a strong steward of investor capital, consistently aligning his own interests with those of shareholders, with Berkshire's wide economic moat derived in part from the success that he has had in melding the firm's financial strength and underwriting ability with his own investment acumen.

Buffett's stewardship has allowed Berkshire to increase its book value per share at an estimated compound annual growth rate of 19.2% during 1965-2016, compared with a 10.0% return for the S&P 500 TR Index. The firm has not only increased its book value per share at a double-digit rate annually 42 separate times during 1965-2017 but also reported declines in its book value just twice during the past 53 years (in 2001 and 2008). Even with the firm's overall results being affected by the 9/11 terrorist attack and the 2008-09 financial crisis during the first decade of the new millennium, Berkshire still generated double-digit rates of annual growth in its book value per share seven times during 2001-10. While we think the firm is unlikely to consistently increase its book value per share at a double-digit rate going forward, given the ever-increasing size and complexity of its operations, we believe it can increase book value per share at a high-single-digit to low-double-digit rate of growth during the next five years, much as we've seen since the start of the millennium.

Given Buffett's impressive long-term record, it is important that much of what he has built over the years will remain intact once he is gone. Succession was not formally addressed by Berkshire until 2005, when the company noted that Buffett's three main jobs--chairman, chief executive, and chief investment officer--would be handled by one chairman (expected to be his son, Howard Buffett), one CEO (with candidates identified but not revealed), and several external hires (reporting directly to the CEO) to manage the investment portfolio. While we have clarity on the investment side of things, with Todd Combs and Ted Weschler expected to be the only outside hires to work with Berkshire's investment portfolio, questions linger over who the firm's next CEO will be.

We continue to envision the main role of the next chief executive to be one of capital allocator in chief. With all of Berkshire's operating businesses managed on a decentralized basis, eliminating the need for layers of management control and pushing responsibility for each business down to the subsidiary level, Buffett has had the freedom to focus on managing the investments in the firm's portfolio and making capital-allocation decisions. He has noted at times, though, that the job requires more than just investing prowess and, as such, he would not advocate for a candidate to run Berkshire who only had investing experience, with no operational experience to speak of. Buffett has also been vocal about the fact that the next CEO will come from within the company's ranks.

We continue to believe Ajit Jain, who was recently added to Berkshire's board, along with gaining the title of vice chairman, insurance operations, and Greg Abel, who also joined the board and was elevated to vice chairman, noninsurance business operations, are the top two candidates to replace Buffett. While Jain's name is
probably the first one on the board of directors' list for the position, we think Berkshire would be better served longer term having him focus on overseeing the entire insurance business (which his new position will allow him to do). While Jain's experience has primarily been on the underwriting side of the business, his success there has been built on his ability to avoid making "dumb decisions" rather than making "brilliant" ones.

If the firm's next CEO is expected to do nothing more than act as a caretaker for the business, tending to the needs of the managers of the different subsidiaries, overseeing the actions of the investment managers handling the company's investment portfolio, and dealing with the capital-allocation and risk assessments that need to be made along the way, then we could not think of a better candidate than Jain. The only problem is that Jain has been on the record several times saying he does not want the job, which is the main reason we regard Abel--who not only brings with him the operational experience of running Berkshire Hathaway Energy for many years but has a ton of experience doing acquisitions--as the most likely choice to succeed Buffett.

**Overview**

**Profile:**

Berkshire Hathaway is a holding company with a wide array of subsidiaries engaged in diverse activities. The firm's core business segment is insurance, run primarily through Geico, General Re, Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, and Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group. The company's second-largest segment includes Burlington Northern Santa Fe (railroad) and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (utilities and energy distributors), followed closely in size and importance by its manufacturing, service, and retailing operations. The rest of Berkshire's portfolio consists of its finance and financial products segment, which is involved in manufactured housing and finance, furniture rental, and rail car and other transportation equipment manufacturing, repair, and leasing.

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